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APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
"EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION" TO THE
PROVISION OF LONG-TERM CARE
Lynnette Dowi Wiggins'

qITRODUCTION
Since the establishment of Medicaid in 1965, states have been forced to
balance the medical needs of their residents against the limited funds and
resources available to care for the poor.' As the number of aliens who
reside in the United States steadily increases, the issue of undocumented
aliens' access to health care services has become an important area of
growing concern to health professionals, social services and government
agencies. 2 Medicaid regulations provide limited funding for the medical
care of aliens lawfiully admitted for permanent residence in the United
States. For aliens not lawfully admitted to the United States,
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1

See, eg, Peter L. Reich, Public Benefitsfor UndocumentedAliens State Law into the

Breach OnceMore,21 N.M. L. REv. 219 (1991) (examining the states! ro!e in providing Medicaid
funding for illegal aliens); Sana Loue, Health Care Rationing and die Undocumented Alicn 4n
Examinationofits Impact and a ProposalforAlternat'cMethodsto Access Care,21 W. St U. L.

REv. 95 (1993) (analyzing the role of the undocumented alien in health care reform),
2
SanaLoueAccesstoHealthCareanddheUndocumcnted.lien, 13J. LEorAL MED 271,
271 (1992). (More than four million people currently live in the United State illegally), Cynthia W.
Brooks, Comment, Health CareReform, ImmigrationLaws, and Federally,MandatedMIedical
Services:Impact ofllegalImmigration,17 Hous. J. rr't. L 141,155 (1994). The economic impact

of providing health care to undocumented aliens has grown particularly rapidly in Calhfomta.
According to the State Department of Health Services, the cost of providing servies to illegal Aen
Nvas $900 million in 1992, an increase of 1,800% over the previous 5 years. Ron Pnnce,Americans
WantllegalImmigrantsOut,LA Tams, Sept. 6,1994, at 7. See also Tony Peny, Gincrndi Offers
toFullyRepayStates on ImmigrantCare,LA Tnms, Oct. 21, 1995, at 1(estimating that in fiscal

year 1995-96, California -wrill pay S382 million to provide emergency medical cervicc to illegal
immigrants, a significant increase from the S21 million paid in 1988-S9).
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Medicaid further limits reimbursement to care that is provided for
emergency medical conditions.3
This comment examines the limited circumstances under which
undocumented aliens may receive government funded access to health care
services through the Medicaid Program. First, it provides a brief overview
of the Federal Medicaid Act and the expansion of Medicaid coverage
provided by a limited number of states. Next, this article provides an
analysis of several recent court decisions, including a decision by the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
holding that healthcare provided to undocumented aliens in a state
rehabilitation center met the Medicaid Act's statutory definition of
"emergency medical care," thereby entitling the center to reimbursement
for the provided health care. Finally, the article discusses the implications
of the New York court's expansive reading of the term "emergency medical
care," including its impact on state and county funded medical care, health
care reform, and on interpretation of the Emergency Med cal Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA).
BACKGROUND
Title XIX of the Social Security Act establishes a jointly funded,
cooperative, federal-state cost-sharing program known as Medicaid.
Congress intended and designed the Medicaid program to enable each state
to provide medical assistance to eligible individuals. 4 Enacted in 1965, the
program was established "for the purpose of providing federal financial
assistance to states that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical
treatment for needy persons."5 In return for cost-sharing by the federal
government, participating states must comply with broad requirements set
forth in the Medicaid Act and by the Secretary of Health and Human

3
Loue, supra note 2, at 288-89. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) defines
the medical assistance benefits provided to aliens not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, 42
C.F.R. § 440.255 (1994) provides the corresponding regulatory guidelines.
5
Loue, supra note 2, at 287. See alsoAtkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986).
GeenexyRehabilitation
=
Group v. Hammon, 893 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(quoting Schveiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 571 (1982)).
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Services. 6 If a state satisfies the requirements, it has wide discretion in
administering its program, "including the responsibility for determining the
eligibility of recipients, enlisting medical service providers, and paying
those providers for services rendered. "7

Two groups of individuals are statutorily and automatically eligible for
Medicaid: the categorically needy and the medically needy.' States that
participafe in the Medicaid program must provide coverage for the
categorically needy. The categorically needy are persons eligible for
assistance under either the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program
or the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.' The
medically needy are persons who may be eligible to receive Medicaid if
they meet the requirements established by the individual state in which they
reside. These medically needy individuals may have resources or income
to provide for some of the basic necessities of life, but not enough for the
expenses required by medical care.1"
When first enacted, the Medicaid statute did not address the issue of
an alien's eligibility to receive services under its program. However,
subsequent statutory revisions and agency regulations have addressed the
issue and currently limit full-scope Medicaid coverage'" to aliens lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence or those
permanently residing in the United States under the color of law

Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (19S6).
GreengoyRehabilitationGroup,S93 F. Supp. at 119S (quoting D-Gregorio v. OBannon,
500 F. Supp. 541,545 (ED. Pa. 1980)).
s
Loue,supra note 2, at 287 (citing the Social SccurityAct, fit. =, 42 U.SoC. §§ 13961396(u) (1988 & Supp. 11989), as amended by Pub.L. No. 101476, 104 Stat 1142, Pub- L No.
101-508,104 Stat 1388).
9
Loue, supranote 2, at2S7-SS. SSI provides cash assistance to low income prona vho
are aged, blind, or disabled. Id. at 288 n.1 15. AFDC provides assistance to needy familics %ith
dependent children. Id.at 287 n. 114.
10 Loue, supra note 2, at 28S.
11 Id.(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(u) (1988 & Supp. 11989)).
12
"Full-scope" Medicaid coverage is used here to include nonemergency and preventive
medical care that is routinely provided to poor, elderky and disabled residents through the Medicaid
program. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 1, at 233. These benefits are limited to citizens of the United
States, la-liil permanent residents, and aliens "permanently residing in the United States under co!or
of law." Id. at 232 n.82.
6

7
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(PRUCOL).13 Statutory amendments have also further broadened
Medicaid to permit federal reimbursement of state expenditures incurred
in the care of undocumented aliens if such care and services are "necessary
for the treatment of an emergency medical condition of the alien [and] such
alien otherwise meets the eligibility requirements for medical assistance
under the state plan

...".

The Medicaid Act defines "emergency medical

condition" as a medical condition (including emergency labor and delivery)
manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe
pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could
reasonably be expected to result in (1) placing the patient's health in serious
jeopardy, (2) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (3) serious
dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. 15
This definition of "emergency medical condition" parallels the
"antidumping" provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA). 6 Arguably the emergency medical care provisions
13

42 U.S.C. § 1396b(vXl) (1998 & Supp. V 1993) and 42 C.F.R. § 435.406(aX2) (1990).

In 1990 HHS published its final rule that PRUCOL aliens are eligible for all Medicaid services, The
PRUCOL category now includes aliens residing in the United States under a grant of voluntary
departure, aliens who are the beneficiaries of approved immediate relative petitionE, asylecs, refugees,
aliens granted stays of deportation, and applicants for adjustment of status to permanent residence.
PRUCOL also includes "any other aliens living in the United States with the knowledge and
permission ofthe Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) whose departure that agency does not
contemplate enforcing." Loue, supra note 2, at 288 n.122. Note that under these regulations full
Medicaid coverage has not been extended to a large group of aliens legally but temporarily residing in
the United States, e.g., those under student or tourist visas. Accord ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §
120.310(bX2) (1995) (specifically excluding persons living in the United States under a study or
tourist visa, temporary workers, business visitors, and finances of U.S. citizens from full-scope
Medicil Assistance coverage).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1396(vX2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The statutory provision specifically
excludes care and services related to an organ transplant procedure. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(v)(2XC) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
16
42 U.S.C. § 1396(v3 (1988 & Sup. V 1993.
1
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (98 & Supp. V 1993). EIALA was enacted to prevent hospital
transfers of unstable emergency patients for economic reasons. The statute requires that any hospital
that receives Medicare payments and has an emergency department must provide an appropriate
medical screening examination to every patient for whom a request is made for examination or
treatment of a medical condition to determine if an emergency medical condition exists. When the
screening examination determines that an emergency medical condition exists, or that the person is
in active labor, the hospital must stabilize the patient's emergency medical condition or provide
treatment of the patients labor within the capabilities of the hospital. The statute defines "emergency
medical condition" as a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity
(including severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be
expected to result in: i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the
health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy, ii) serious impairment to bodily
functions, or iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part, 42 U.S.C. § 1.395dd(eXl) (1988 &
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of the two statutes should work together to: (1) screen and treat
undocumented aliens needing emergency medical care; and (2) reimburse
hospitals through Medicaid for the costs of emergency care provided to
undocumented17 aliens who meet the financial and residency requirements
for Medicaid.
Although the availability of medical care to undocumented aliens
through state and local programs varies considerably, statutory and
regulatory provisions for Medicaid reimbursement for emergency medical
care closely resembles federal legislation in many states.'" Judicial
interpretation of what constitutes "emergency medical care" in the context
of Medicaid reimbursement is, however, significantly limited and highly
dependent on the factual basis of each claim.' 9

CASES HOLDING LONG-TERM MEDICAL CARE
WITHIN STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION"
The leading federal case dealing with the issue of "emergency medical
care" within the statutory and regulatory definitions of the Medicaid Act,
is GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, Inc v. Hammon."' In Greenery, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held
the operator of a specialized brain injury treatment program was entitled
to Medicaid reimbursement for chronic care provided to two aliens who
suffered permanent traumatic brain damage."' The court's decision rested
on the finding that the chronic care received by the aliens was "emergency
Supp. V 1993).
Loue, supra note 2, at 289.
See, eg., CAL.WELF.&I.sr.COD. § 14007.5(d) (West 1995); IL. A :
tit, 89,
§ 120310 (1995), MA S.REGS. CODEtit 130, § 507.600 (1995) and N.Y. Co:.P. Coc: R. & Rr-c,-:.
tit 18, § 360-3.2(0 (1995). Several states, e.g. California, have extended Medicaid coverage to
undocumented aliens to include "necessary pregnancy-related services." C.,L. WELF. & IsrT. CoD. §
14007.5(d) (West1995). See alsoLewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1221 (2d Cir. 1992) (enjoining
Secretary of Health and Human Services from denying Medicaid coverage for prenatal care to nonPRUCOL aliens finding that Congress did not intend to prevent other ie eligible women from
receiving such care "to benefit their future citizen children").
19 See discussion infra notes 20-79 and accompanying text.
17

is

20
21

Greenery Rehabilitation Group v. Hammon, 893 F. Supp. 1195 (W.D1NTY. 1995).
Id. at 1207.
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medical care" within the Medicaid statutory definition.22

At the time of the facts giving rise to this litigation, the Greenery
Rehabilitation Group, Inc. ("Greenery") operated facilities specializing in
the long-term treatment of patients with traumatic brain injuries. Through
an agreement with the New York City Human Resources Administration
(HRA), Greenery provided and expected reimbursement for care given to
New York City residents meeting Medicaid financial eligibility criteria.23
In accordance with this agreement, Greenery admitted three patients into
its specialized brain injury treatment program. The three patients were
immigrants who resided in New York City. All three patients sustained
serious brain damage from traumatic injuries and received initial care for
their injuries at other New York hospitals before being transferred to
Greenery for long term care.24 When HRA refused to reimburse Greenery
for the specialized care provided, Greenery filed suit seeking
reimbursement.2
The main issue raised at trial was whether the services provided to the
three aliens at Greenery met the Medicaid statutory and regulatory
definition of an "emergency medical condition." If so, Greenery was
entitled to Medicaid reimbursement.26 In reaching its decision, the court
analyzed the facts regarding the condition of the three patients and the care
received by each.
The first patient, I.U., treated by Greenery, suffered a severe brain
injury in a 1991 car accident,27 which rendered her paralyzed in all of her
limbs, left her unable to speak and with difficulty swallowing and a
tracheostomy to help her breath. Since the patient had difficulty
swallowing, it was necessary for her to be fed through a tube inserted into
22

Id. at 1205-07.

23

Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1197-98.

24

GreeneViRelbabilltation Group v. IHammon, J93 F. Supp. 1195,1198 (ND.N.Y.., 1995).
Before tMing its attention to the central issue, the court determned the Greenery
received prior authorization and followed proper Medicaid procedures for the admission of the three
patients. Therefore, reimbursement could not be denied on the basis that prior authorization for care
had not been received. Id. at 1201. New York State regulations provide that aliens lawfully admitted
to the United States for permanent residence or who otherwise meet PRUCOL requirements and meet
Medicaid financial and residency criteria are eligible to receive the full range of'Medicaid benefits,
Non-PRUCOL aliens, however, are not eligible to receive medical assistance unless the care is
necessary for the treatment of an "emergency medical condition." The New York statutory definition
of"emergency medical condition" is substantially the same as that of the federal Medicaid Act. Id. at
1198. See also N.Y. CoMP. CODES R. &REGS. tit. 18, § 360-3.2(f) (1995).
27
GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, 893 F.Supp. at 1197.
2
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her stomach. The tube required careful monitoring to prevent infection
and to ensure that she received proper nutrition.' The patient's attending
physician established that the patient was unable to feed herselt was unable
to get out of bed on her own or bathe independently. Testimony
established that if treatment was withdrawn, the patient would die. The
defendant's expert agreed that the patient required total nursing care, the
absence of which would eventually, but not immediately, place her health
in serious jeopardy.'
The second patient, Y.K., treated at Greenery, was an immigrant
legally residing in New York City, suffered brain damage in 1990 when he
was beaten with a blunt instrument in Manhattan's Central Park. 39
Although Y.K. recovered significantly from his initial injuries, he still
suffered from tardive dyskinesia3 and behavioral problems which caused
him to physically strike staff and other patients and to become physically
aggressive in response to frustration. Partially as the result of his injuries,
Y.K. was also legally blind.32 In contrast to I.U., Y.K. was able to walk
without assistance, feed himsel use the bathroom and groom himself but
required direction to do so. Y.K. had not required continuous medical
care at any time since his injury.33 Y.K.'s treating physician testified that
although he would classify the care Y.K. received as chronic rather than
emergency care, without such care Y.K.'s health would be in serious
jeopardy. In the treating physician's opinion, Greenery provided some
emergency care to Y.K. under the regulatory definition.34 The defendant's
expert agreed that although the treatment Y.K. received was medically
necessary, she did not believe the absence of that care would place Y.K.'s

2

Id. at 1201-02.

Idat 1202. The cost of care provided to LU. by the Greenery, at rate- approved by the
Id.v..Hammorl,
at 1198.
York,
was S152,612.28.
State ofJsNew
S93 F. Supp. 1195,197 (TNY IN),
Gropp
qrre
, ryRehbilitatiQn
3
29

ardive dyskinesia is an impairment ot voluntary movement, typ:i ly markc by
repetitive involuntary motions ofthe of the face and mouth. Although principally affeating the elderly,
it is also induced by long-term administration of antipsychotic agents and may przist after %,ithdraval

of the agent
32

33
34

DoRLAND'S ILLUTsTRATED MEDiCAL

DcnoARY 516 (28th ed. 1994).

GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, 893 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
IR at 1203.
Id.
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health in "serious jeopardy" as required by the Medicaid regulation.3 s
L.C., the final patient considered by the court in Greenery, was a
thirty-eight-year-old immigrant who resided in New York City when he
was shot in 1991.' As a result of his gunshot injury, L.C. suffered damage
to the frontal lobe of his brain which affected his judgment and response
to his environment. L.C. was unable to walk short distances by himself and
required the assistance of a personal attendant as well as parallel bars.
Confined and restrained to a wheelchair, L.C. required assistance to bathe
and use the bathroom. Although able to feed himself when presented with
food, he was unable to obtain his own food. The medications prescribed
to treat L.C.'s behavioral problems and seizure disorder required careful
monitoring and continuous medical care." L.C.'s treating physician
testified that although he classified the care L.C. received as chronic,
without such care the patient's health would be placed in serious jeopardy.
The physician testified that at least some of the care provided by Greenery
was emergency care under the regulatory definition.38 The defendant's
expert agreed that L.C. was dependent on nursing assistance for grooming,
eating, bathing, and moving to other locations. However, the expert
nevertheless felt that the absence of such care would not place L.C.'s health
in "serious jeopardy as used in the regulation to mean a life or death
9
situation.
In analyzing the issue of whether Greenery was entitled to Medicaid
reimbursement for the care provided the three aliens, the court applied the
statutory and regulatory definitions of "emergency medical condition" to
that care.' The court noted that the decision maker is given great latitude
in determining whether an alien's condition is an "emergency medical

condition" entitling him to Medicaid benefits. The court also stated that
35 Greenery Rehabilitation Group v. Hammon, 893 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 (N.D.N.Y., 1995)
The cost of Y.K.'s care at the Greenery was $213,916.10. Id. at 1198.
16
37

Id. at 1198.

38
39

Id. at 1203-04.
Id. at 1204 LC's care at the Greenery cost S181,604.76. Id. at 1198.

Id. at 1203.

40 GreeneryRehabilitation Group v. Hammon, 893 F. Supp. 1195, 1204-1205 (noting also
that the common definition ofemergency care used in the medical field is not the same as the relevant

statutory definition).
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expert medical judgment must guide in this determination."
Regarding U., the court concluded that without the care she
received at Greenery, she would have soon become malnourished and
dehydrated and would have developed a variety of infections. Because
these problems would certainly have "place[ed] her health in serious
jeopardy and seriously impair[ed] her bodily functions," the care I.U.
received at Greenery fulfilled the statutory definition of emergency medical
care.

42

Applying the same definition and analysis to the care provided Y.K.,
the court reached a different conclusion. Here, the court concluded Y.K.'s
ability to perform bodily functions, such as feeding and grooming himself,
indicated that the absence of immediate medical attention would not have
placed Y.K.'s health or bodily functions in serious jeopardy. The court
found that the "immediacy requirement" was clearly missing and therefore
held that an "emergency medical condition" did not exist.43
Similar to I.U.'s care, the court found L.C.'s care at Greenery met the
statutory and regulatory requirements of "emergency medical care,""4
L.C.'s inability to walk, feed himself, or use the bathroom without
assistance led to the conclusion that without that care L.C. would have
been "left without food, in his own waste, [and] unable to move," placing
his health in serious jeopardy.45 Based on these findings, the court held
that Greenery had provided emergency medical care to LU. and L.C. and
41

Id. at 1205. The court emphasized that in formulating the correponding regulatory

definition of"emergency medical condition," the Department of Health and Human Sernicea (1M-I)
used substantially the same language as the Medicaid statute itself but vith the additional requirement
that the condition manifest "after sudden onset" thereby alloving broad discretion in interpretation.
Citing HHS's response to comments received in response to the regulation, the court noted the agency s
beliefthat states be allowed "to interpret and further define the serices available to aliens" under the
statute "supported by professional medical judgment," Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 36813, 36816 (1990)),
When giving weight to the deposition testimony provided, the court gave greater deference to that of
the treating physicians than to that of the defendant's experts, opining that the treating phyieians' long

history ofcaring for the patients provided a more thorough basis for decision than did that ofa stateappointed observer who "based her testimony solely on witnessing the patients for no more than one
day... and on a reading of their medical records." GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, S93 F. Supp. at
1205.
42
GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, 893 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
43 Id. at 1206 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
I4

45

I&
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was therefore entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for their care. 6 In
contrast, the court held the care received by Y.K. did not fall within the
statutory definition of "emergency medical care," and that Greenery was
not entitled to reimbursement under the Medicaid statute.47 In reaching its
conclusion, the court cited Mercy HealthcareAriz., Inc. v. Ariz. Health
Care Cost ContainmentSystem,48 discussed infra,as a persuasive authority
to support its holdings.49
Another significant decision to examine is Mercy HealthcareAriz.,
Inc. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment System. ' In Mercy
Healthcare Ariz., Inc., the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded a lower court's grant of summary judgement in favor of Arizona
Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS). )In that case,
AHCCCS denied Medicaid reimbursement to Mercy Healthcare Arizona
(Mercy) for the long-term skilled nursing care of F.L., an undocumented
alien. 5 Similar to I.U. in Greener)' Rehabilitation Grozp, Inc., F.L.
suffered serious injuries, including permanent brain damage, which left him
non-verbal and paralyzed in his lower extremities. F.L. required a
tracheostomy tube for breathing and a gastrointestinal tube for feeding.5
A physician affidavit submitted by the plaintiff stated that fiailure to keep
F.L. in the hospital or transfer him to a skilled nursing facility would have
placed F.L.'s health in serious jeopardy, would likely have caused his
condition to deteriorate rapidly, and would have required "readmission to
the hospital within days, if not sooner.""
The principle issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly
interpreted the term "emergency medical condition" as statutorily defined
in Arizona.' In its argument before the court, Mercy contended that if an
undocumented alien suffers from an emergency medical condition,
AHCCCS must cover that patient's treatment as long as the emergency

46
47
48

Id. at 1206-07.
Id.
MercyHealthcare Ariz.v.Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 887 P,2d 625 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 1994)
49
GreeneryRehabilitationGroup, 893 F. Supp. at 1206.
so Mercy HealthcareAriz., 887 P.2d at 625.
51
Id. at 630.
52

51
54

Id. at 627.
Id. at 629.

Id. at 627. Arizona recognizes an "emergency medical condition" as that defined in
section 1903(v) of the Social Security Act. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2905.05 (1993),
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medical condition requires uninterrupted care.55 In contrast, AHCCCS
argued that an emergency medical condition exists only when the patient
suffers acute symptoms which require immediate medical attention to avoid
firther harm to the patient's health or body. AHCCCS maintained that its
financial responsibility for care ended when the emergency medical
56
condition stabilized.
The Court of Appeals of Arizona rejected both parties' "extreme
interpretations" of emergency medical condition and relied instead on the
plain language of the Arizona statute.5 Noting that the Arizona legislature
had adopted the federal Medicaid statute's definition of an "emergency
medical condition," the court held "the statute does not limit coverage to
services for treatment while acute symptoms continue. "" Rather, the
statute mandates that AHCCCS cover services for treatment of a medical
condition as long as the absence of immediate treatment, "could reasonably
be expected to result in one of the three consequences defined by
statute. '59
A similar issue is presented in Crespin v. Kizer " In Crespin, the
California Court of Appeals enjoined the State Department of Health
Services (Department) from denying Medi-Cal coverage for medically
necessary long-term care or renal dialysis services for non-PRUCOL
aliens. 6' Although the central issue of the case was whether a 1988
revision of the Medi-Cal statute implicitly authorized state Medi-Cal
reimbursement for such services,62 rather than whether such services
MercyHealtheare Ariz. v Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sy:,, 887 P.2d 625,628
(Ariz. Ct App. 1994).
55
Id
57
Id.
58 Id. at 628-29.
59
Id. at 629.
60
Crespin v.IKzer,276 Cal. Rptr. 571 (Cal. Ct.App. 1990), as modified on demal ofreh g
(1991).
61
Id. at 583.
62
Crespin arose in response to a 1988 statutory amendment to the Medi-Cal Act (CAL.
,VELF. & LIST. CODE, §§ 14000 et seq.) which expanded state funded Medi-Cal coverage to
nonemergency pregnancy-related care and addressed how the state would handle coverage for aliens
needing long-term care or renal dialysis. At issue in Crespin was whether the phrase vhieh extended
i
coverage for long-term care and renal dialysis to non-PRUCOL aliens bnare reeinv
thzae
services applied only to non-PRUCOL aliens receiving services on the date the amendment was
enacted orto all aliens receiving long-term care and renal dialysis benefits at the time the statute xvw
55
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qualified as "emergency medical care," the court noted in dicta that in most
cases renal dialysis does constitute "emergency" treatment for which
federal financial assistance would be available.63 In analyzing the issues,
the court specifically cited expert testimony which demonstrated that

denying necessary long term care to unqualified aliens who required
dialysis would lead to the "deterioration of their chronic conditions, and
that [patients] would be increasingly subject to sudden and life-threatening
medical cris[e]s such as congestive heart failure or serious infection."'

The court opined that even during a time of fiscal restraint, providing such
care to undocumented aliens is a fiscally prudent and wise policy. To deny

such care would force the "inevitable deterioration of these medical
conditions into unnecessary emergency conditions requiring extremely
expensive care."65
Finally in Gaddam v. Rowe,' the Superior Court of Connecticut
extended the dicta of Crespin and specifically held that outpatient renal

dialysis was "emergency medical care" within the statutory meaning of the
Medicaid Act. 67 At issue was the State Department of Social Services'
refusal to pay for continued outpatient dialysis following plaintiff Gaddam's

initial hospitalization for renal failure.68 In ordering Medicaid payment for
Mr. Gaddam's treatment, the court noted that the Medicaid statute does
not call for "medical Russian Roulette, ... Le. stop payment, wait a short

applied. Id at 576-77. Effective Sept. 15, 1992, the relevant provisions of the California statute were
amended to apply to aliens who were receiving long-term care or renal dialysis on the day prior to the
effective date of the 1988 amendments, specifically excluding continuation of care to any person
whose long term care or renal dialysis ended after the effective date of the amendment. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 14007.5(k) (West 1992).
63 Crespin,276 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (noting that the State Department of Health Services, had
acknowledged in most cases that renal dialysis constitutes "emergency" treatment). The definition of
"emergency medical condition" in the California statute is substantially the same as that of federal law.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 14007.5(d) (West 1992).
6
Crespin,276 Cal. Rptr. at 575.
65
66 Crespin v. Kizer, 276 Cal. Rptr. 571 582 n.18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
Gaddam v. Rove, No. CV940356513, 1995 WL631983, *1 (Conn, Super. Ct. Oct.
13, 1995).
67
Id.at*1-*3.
68 Ashok Gaddam, a student from India residing in Connecticut under it
student visa, had
developed acute symptoms of kidney failure requiring renal dialysis. Although the State Department
of Social Services had paid the entire costs of Mr. Gaddam's initial hospitalization and dialysis, it
refused to pay for outpatient dialysis arguing that Mr. Gaddam's medical condition was no longer an
emergency because Mr. Gaddam was no longer suffering from the acute symptoms of renal failure.
Testimony on behalf of the plaintiff provided that if Mr. Gaddam were to stop dialysis the acute
symptoms would quickly reappear and Mr. Gaddam would die within one to two weeks. Id. at * 1.
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time for symptoms to recur then hope you are in time to
get the plaintiff to
9
the hospital to restart the treatment before he dies."G
CASES HOLDING LONG-TERM MEDICAL CARE
NOT WITHIN STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
"EMERGENCY MEDICAL CONDITION"
In Dominguez v. SuperiorCourt,7" the California Court of Appeals held
that a bone marrow transplant for an undocumented alien suffering from
leukemia did not fall within the state's statutory definition of necessary
emergency medical treatment." The plaintiffs treating physician testified
that without such treatment, the cancer cells would multiply and result in
plaintiffs death within two to three years.'
Although the court
acknowledged that plaintiffs argument appealed to basic humanitarian
concerns, the court determined the procedure fell short of being necessary
for the treatment of an "emergency medical condition" as required by
statute. The court relied on the state's argument that a leukemia patient
must be in remission to receive a bone marrow transplant and held such a
transplant can never be an "emergency procedure" within the statutory
definition because the transplant can only be performed on a stable patient
with no acute symptoms.73
Similarly in Norwood Hosp. v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare,74 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a lower court's decision
which denied Medicaid reimbursement to plaintiff Norwood Hospital for
the care it rendered to an undocumented alien whose chronic alcoholism
69

Crespin, 276 Cal. Rptr. at *2-*3 (citing the reasoning of Cre-pin, GrccnL',r

RehabilitationGroup, and Mercy HealthcareAriz, noted supra).
70
Dominguez v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
71
Id. at 568.
72 Id.at 567-68.
73 Id. at 568. Although the court failed to find a bone marrow transplant "emergency
medical care" thereby entitling plaintiff to Medi-Cal payment, the service was covered under a 1988
state statutory amendment This amendment included within covered service3 care whieh v;a a
"continuation of medically necessary inpatient hospital services and follow-up care .. ,hich [vas]

directly related to the emergency." Ikl at 568-71 (referring to CAL. WELF. &I,T. § 14007,5(d){3)
(Vest 1988)). The Medi-Cal statute was subsequently amended to delete this provi ion. See Cal.
Welf. & Inst § 14007.5(d)(3) (West 1992).
74

Norwood Hosp. v. Comm'r Pub. Welfare, 627 N.E2d 914 (ass.

1994).

JOURAL OFHEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:50

resulted in such severe renal and hepatic failure that it caused her death
within seven weeks of hospitalization." Although the defendant and court
agreed the patient was seriously ill when she sought and received treatment
from Norwood Hospital, the court held the patient's condition did not meet
the statutory and regulatory definition of "emergency medical condition."76
The court gave great weight to the State Department's interpretation of its
own rule and found the patient had not possessed an "emergency medical
condition" because her chronic alcoholism had so "compromised her liver
and ... central nervous system ... before she appeared at [the hospital] ...

that the lack of immediate medical attention would not have resulted in
more serious jeopardy to her health."77 Accepting the Department's policy
position, the court opined that if the patient's condition entitled her to
Medicaid coverage, then any undocumented alien with a serious medical
condition would be deemed eligible for medical assistance whether or not
the absence of immediate medical attention could7 8reasonably be expected
to place that alien's health in "serious jeopardy.
CONCLUSION AND IMPACT
The recent expansive interpretation of "emergency medical condition"
given by the courts to long-term care as it relates to eligibility for state and
federal Medicaid benefits may have broad reaching effects on health
services funding and the provisions of the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). Currently state and county hospitals
and other health care providers bear the burden to fund the majority of
uncompensated medical care in the United States, including care for
undocumented aliens.79 States such as California, New 'York, Texas,
Illinois and Florida, where the vast majority of illegal aliens reside, must
75

Id. at 915-16.

76

Id. at 917. The definition of "emergency medical condition" as defined by MAss. REOS.

CoDE tit. 130, § 507.600 (1995) is substantially identical to that of 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v) (1998 &
Supp. V 1993).
77
NorwoodHosp., 627 N.E2d at 917. The department's determination that the patient did
not possess an "emergency medical condition" was based on physician testimony asserting he had been
chronically sick for a long time and the outcome would have been the same whether he was admitted
to the hospital that day or a week later. Id. at 917 n.5.
78
Id. at916-17.
79
See Loue, supra note 2, at 296-97 (discussing the availability of medical care to
undocumented aliens through state and local programs).
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cany the entire social and economic burden for this care unless the federal
government contributes to its cost." Expansion of Medicaid coverage and
federal cost-sharing to include care for conditions not traditionally
considered "emergencies"'" will shift the financial burden of
uncompensated care, at least in part, to the federal government. From a
policy perspective, this cost shifting transfers a portion of the financial
burden of illegal aliens to the government sector which possesses exclusive
control over immigration policies. 2
The EMTALA definition of "emergency medical condition"" is
substantially identical to that provided in the federal Medicaid Act and
corresponding regulations.8" This similarity ensures that undocumented
aliens will receive emergency medical care within
the meaning of
85
EMTALA and hospital reimbursement for that care.
Arguably, the broad judicial interpretation of the term "emergency
medical condition" under the Medicaid Act may ultimately broaden the
medical conditions which fall under EMTALA. Traditionally, the term
"emergency medical condition" under EMTALA denotes the provision of
emergency medical care and the concept of imminent danger of death or
serious disability, 6 rather than medical deterioration occurring over the
course of time. Further, EMTALA requires a hospital to provide
treatment "within the staff and facilities available at the hospital" to
stabilize a patients emergency medical condition.87 Therefore, such an
expansive interpretation of "emergency medical condition" could extend
so

Brooks, supra note 2, at 166-67.

s1 As the court noted in Greene. Rehabilitation Group, the common definition of
emergency care used in the medical field is not the same as the definition of emergency care

established in the Medicaid statute. Greenery Rehabilitation Group v. Hammon, S93 F. Supp 1195,
1205 (ND.N.Y. 1995). In the medical context, emergency is defined as an "unlboked for or sudden
occasion; an accident; an urgent or pressing need." Do, oS
k!.LusiuDoEDicDALDIcriozrAY
544 (28th ed. 1994).
s2 Brooks, supra note 2, at 14142 (also reviewing various Immigration and Nationality Act
amendments aimed at stemming the influx of illegal aliens).

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 &Supp. V 1993). ForadiscussionofE ITALAseenote16,

supra.

S42 U.S.C. §1396b(v)3_)(1988 &Supp. V 1993) and 42 C.RR § 440255(c 1)(1994).
85 Notably absent from EMTALA is a provision providing funding for the care ospits
provide in accordance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
86 See, e.g., Thorton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1990).
87
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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EMTALA's coverage to hospitalized patient's who have recovered from an
initial acute condition but continue to require long-term intensive
rehabilitative care. Such a reading would place the transfer of these
patients to a long term care facility within the reach of EMTALA.
However, EMTALA only requires that patients be stabilized prior to
transfer from a hospital, and the term "stabilized" means, with respect to
an emergency medical condition, that "no material deterioration of the
condition is likely to result from or occur during transfer of the individual
from a facility."88 Thus, it is unlikely that the number of transfers deemed
to be violations of the Act will substantially increase.8 9
In summary, recent court decisions have broadly interpreted the
definition of "emergency medical condition" in the Medicaid Act to include
chronic conditions that require intensive long-term rehabilitative care. One
effect of this expansive interpretation will be an increase in federal costsharing for the medical care of undocumented aliens. The interpretation's
effect on other statutes such as EMTALA, containing substantially similar
definitions of "emergency medical condition," is less clear.

88

42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(eX3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See, e.g., Thorton, 895 F.2d at 1134-35 (finding hospital that released stroke victim
when her emergency medical condition had stabilized did not violate EMTALA).
89

